Judicial independence is everywhere these days, and there seems to be a normative consensus that it is a good thing. The General Assembly of the UN supports it; the World Bank and other donors spend significant funds promoting it; and governments, both democratic and authoritarian, proclaim its existence. Despite all this effort and normative support, we know relatively little about the makeup and determinants of judicial independence. Judicial independence has become like freedom: everyone wants it but no one knows quite what it looks like or how to get it, and it is easiest to observe in its absence. We think we can tell when judges are dependent on politicians or outside pressures, but it is much more difficult to say definitively when judges are independent.
Given the importance placed on judicial independence by the international community, it is perhaps unsurprising that, over the past 25 years, constitutional drafters have begun to incorporate provisions that insulate the judiciary from external interference. Many states' constitutions now contain explicit declarations that the judiciary is independent, provisions that insulate the tenures and salaries of judges, and limitations on the roles of the executive and legislative branches in the selection and removal of judges. Such provisions were relatively rare in constitutions written just 25 years ago. Prior to 1985, almost 600 constitutions were written and sixty percent contained either zero or one of the six constitutional features that we argue can enhance the independence of the judiciary.
1 Since 1985, we have witnessed a spike in such provisions, with two-thirds of contemporary constitutions (those written since 1985) containing two or more features that enhance judicial independence.
1 A description of these six features can be found below in the section entitled "Components of
De Jure Judicial Independence," where we describe our operationalization of de jure judicial independence.
One might expect that such a sharp increase in de jure judicial independence would be accompanied by an increase in de facto judicial independence. Hayo and Voigt's (2007; findings would certainly support such an expectation. They find that, while de jure judicial independence is not closely related to de facto independence, it is still the single most important determinant thereof (Hayo and Voigt 2007) . Their result provides direct evidence to corroborate the observation that de jure judicial independence improves de facto human rights protection, a relationship that is presumably mediated by de facto judicial independence (see, for example, Camp Keith 2002a; Camp Keith 2002b; Camp Keith et al. 2009 ). Here, we further explore this relationship in hopes of reconciling the results reported by Hayo and Voigt (2007) and Camp Keith et al. (2009) with the common perception that parchment barriers are insufficient to create judicial independence in practice. We are particularly interested in identifying the conditions (if any) under which a relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence holds. We use data on de jure judicial independence from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) and data on de facto judicial independence from Linzer and Staton (2012) to understand when de jure constitutional law is likely to affect de facto institutional practice.
The article is organized as follows. We begin with some conceptual considerations, providing our definition of judicial independence, and articulate a theory of the association between de jure and de facto judicial independence. Next, we introduce six aspects of constitutions that we expect to enhance judicial independence in practice, explain how we operationalize those concepts, and provide some data on the prevalence of those aspects in constitutions written around the world since 1789. We then turn to the empirical analysis, where we conduct an original statistical analysis that focuses on the individual aspects of constitutions we expect to enhance independence.
We find that the only provisions in constitutions that affect de facto judicial independence are the ones that are self-enforcing as a result of competition between the executive and legislative branches. Specifically, we argue that judicial independence is enhanced in practice when both the selection and removal process for judges is one that ensures judges are independent from other political actors. The effect is strongest in contexts where executive authority is checked by other political actors and in authoritarian regimes.
Importantly, this result explains the lack of relationship observed between de jure and de facto judicial independence illustrated in figure 1. Despite overall increases in de jure judicial independence, few constitutions written over the last 25 years create selection and removal procedures that enhance judicial independence. Thus, based on our findings, it is unsurprising that better de jure protection of judicial independence has not improved the independence of judges in practice. Our results have important implications for institutional reform strategies and, more generally, for our understanding of the effectiveness of parchment barriers.
Conceptualizing Judicial Independence
Just two days before her electoral loss to Benigno Aquino, President Gloria Arroyo of the Staton characterize a judge as independent "in so far as her decisions reflect her evaluation of the legal regard and in so far as those decisions are respected by government officials." This concept incorporates two slightly different dimensions: autonomy (the ability to decide freely in accordance with the best view of the law) and power or efficacy (the ability to make decisions stick). These dimensions roughly map onto those identified by Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2011;  see also Rios-Figueroa 2011) . Similarly, Garoupa and Ginsburg (2009) lay out a dynamic model in which a judiciary can shift along two dimensions: independence-accountability and strengthweakness.
Levels of independence can vary across areas of the law, types of cases and courts within a single jurisdiction. Judiciaries differ in the scope of activity over which they are independent.
Independence is thus a two-dimensional problem: one can imagine a judiciary that is very independent but only has a narrow scope of activity, or conversely, a judiciary that is highly responsive to manipulation and governs a wide range of activity. It is also possible to have, as John Ferejohn (1999) put it, independent judges with a dependent judiciary, in which the overall judiciary is subject to pressures while individuals within it are not.
Notwithstanding all these nuances, at its core, judicial independence involves the ability and willingness of courts to decide cases in light of the law without undue regard to the views of other government actors. Given all the other values that we might want out of a judiciary, such as consistency, accuracy, predictability, and speedy decision-making, it is not clear that this is the supreme quality we want to observe. But it is, nevertheless, an important component in many definitions of judicial quality, and a judiciary that repeatedly decides cases in legally implausible ways under the influence of government actors is likely to suffer a decline in its reputation for independence and quality (Vanberg 2005; Staton 2011 ).
However conceived, judicial independence can vary across and even within particular courts. In particular, we ought to consider that different courts within the same country can have different levels of independence. A local court may be quite independent of local government but beholden to senior judges who control promotions (Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2007) . A Supreme Court might receive no political influence or pressure, yet be so ideologically in line with government that it never rules against it in salient cases (Silverstein 2008) . The Supreme Court may be independent but local courts corrupt (as in India, for example). In our analysis, we focus on the independence of the highest ordinary court in the jurisdiction. This decision is based on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, the highest ordinary court is typically the court of last resort, so its independence (or lack thereof) is likely to affect the independence of the entire judiciary. Practically, focusing on the highest ordinary court reduces the aforementioned dimensions of variance to make the analysis manageable and is standard practice in the existing literature.
As a final preliminary point, it is becoming increasingly clear that democracy is not a prerequisite for judicial independence (Moustafa 2007; Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008) . Many general theories of judicial independence focus on the link with political competition, and it is probably true that judges as a general matter have greater levels of independence in democracies than in dictatorships. However, it would be overstated to say that democracy is a strict requirement for judicial independence.
Why Might Text Matter?
It is a general challenge to the empirical study of constitutions to understand exactly when and how formal provisions might make a difference. The general understanding of the literature is that constitutional arrangements work only when they are likely to be self-enforcing, in the sense that there is no external actor needed to police the bargain (Ordeshook 1991; Weingast 1997) . Publicly available textual provisions help facilitate self-enforcement by providing a clear focal point around which the subjects of the Constitution can concentrate their enforcement efforts (Carey 2000; Elkins et al. 2009 ). But these general intuitions do not speak directly to judicial independence.
Let us start by acknowledging that among constitutional branches, the judiciary is relatively weak. Lacking the proverbial pen or the sword, the judiciary ultimately relies on a stock of political capital among key audiences that can help it to enforce its decisions (such as the police or executive) or defend it against attack from other actors (such as the general public).
The comparative literature on courts has documented how judges exercise strategies to help build up their power and reputation among different audiences (for a review of this literature, see Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009 Other provisions require an external audience that supports the judiciary. For example, consider Constitutions that explicitly state the judiciary shall be independent -77% of constitutions in force make such a declaration. If the judiciary makes a decision that is unpopular with the executive or legislature, then simply having a few words in the constitution that guarantee the independence of the judiciary is unlikely to prevent either of these bodies from curtailing judicial independence. For such a provision to be effective, it needs to increase the probability that an external audience will be willing to punish actors that infringe upon the principle of judicial independence. Similarly, some provisions require actors to monitor violations and enforce norms when they are violated. Provisions of this sort come in many varieties: long terms for judges, protection of judges' salaries, prohibition of mandatory retirement ages, etc. Given the coordination problems surrounding such enforcement, we expect that enforcement will be more likely for provisions that are more specific. A blanket guarantee of judicial independence, for example, is less likely to be enforced by external actors than life terms or salary guarantees for judges. A blanket, nominal guarantee leaves too much uncertainty about the meaning of judicial independence (scholars cannot even agree on how to define it), and this will prevent coordination. Institutional protections for salary or term, on the other hand, are very clear, which increases the likelihood that actors will agree on the meaning of the provision.
Such agreement facilitates the ability of external audiences to identify violations and to coordinate to punish violators (Carey 2000; Weingast 1997 ).
Judicial independence in constitutions is a bit different from other powers in the way in which it is specified. Elkins et al. (2012) argue that executive and legislative power depends on the number of powers assigned to the respective branches. Each additional power granted to the executive and legislative branches gives them either greater agenda control or a greater ability to punish the other branch. Both of these aspects of political power increase the range of policies that one branch can pressure the other into approving. Judicial independence, however, does not work in the same way because it does not involve affirmative grants of power (which define the scope of judicial decision-making) so much as institutional protections that facilitate the exercise of powers. Constitutional protection of the judiciary insulates it from coercion by the other branches of government, enhancing its autonomy. As a result, any gap in that protection creates an opportunity that the other branches of government can exploit.
Take, for instance, the selection and removal procedures of judges. Consider a constitution that provides the following procedure for the selection of supreme court justices: 1) the judicial council presents a list of candidates to the executive, 2) the executive proposes a candidate from that list to the legislature, and 3) the legislature must approve the candidate by a supermajority vote. 3 Such a procedure would seem to guarantee that the judges selected to serve on the supreme court are not biased towards any particular political actor. Now assume that, in that same constitution, the procedure to remove supreme court justices is dominated by the legislature, which is similar to the removal procedure specified in the Philippines' 1986 Constitution discussed in the previous section. In this fictitious constitution, even though the justices selected for the supreme court are fairly independent, they will be forced to keep the legislature happy to remain in office. Supreme court judges that are dependent on the legislature to remain in office can undermine judicial independence throughout the judiciary.
Unlike the theory of executive and legislative power presented by Elkins et al. (2012) , or the implicit theories adopted by the literature on judicial independence (Camp Keith et al 2009;
Abbasi 2013), our theory of judicial independence is not additive. Simply adding more de jure protection is not expected to increase judicial independence in practice because those who wish to interfere with courts need only find one hole in the judicial armor. Instead of treating each aspect of de jure protection as contributing equally to de facto judicial independence, we expect that multiple aspects of de jure judicial independence must be combined for that protection to be effective. Specifically, we think that combining selection and removal procedures that involve multiple actors will enhance de facto judicial independence. These aspects of de jure protection allow the selection of independent judges who lack fear of arbitrarily being removed from office, and are most likely to be self-enforcing.
There is, of course, nothing determinative about text. There is no guarantee that textual provisions will be observed or that they will facilitate coordination. Indeed, existing scholarship has found an increasing gap between constitutional text and constitutional practice as the documents matured over time (Elkins et al. 2009: 30) . Our argument here is probabilistic.
Ceteris paribus, textual promises will facilitate enforcement to the extent that they raise the visibility of judicial independence for simple coordination matters or designate multiple officials to be involved in institutional processes related to the judiciary.
Components of De Jure Judicial Independence
There are few studies that specify which aspects of constitutions should enhance judicial independence. Hayo and Voigt (2007) The latter is more consistent with our theory, which suggests that the role of the constitution is to create a judiciary that is autonomous from the other branches of government.
As a result, the aspects we examine all enhance judicial autonomy. Our list is more expansive than that created by Rios-Figueroa, though, because we include some items from Hayo and Voigt. Specifically, we focus on six aspects of constitutions:
1) Statement of Judicial Independence. Our first criterion is simply nominal: we ask whether the constitution contains an explicit declaration regarding the independence of the central judicial organ. This is the variable analyzed in Hayo and Voigt (2010) .
Recall that we are skeptical about the effect such a declaration will have on judicial independence in practice.
2) Judicial tenure. The founders of the US Constitution felt that they needed to give judges lifetime appointments to enhance independence. In some countries, however, judges are subject to limited tenures that vary from one year (e.g., Syria's Constitution of 1930) to fifteen years (e.g. Mexico after 1994). Hayo and Voigt (2007) code judges with limited tenures as having more independence if they are only allowed one term, on the theory that judges with single terms will be less beholden to politicians involved in reappointment. Rios-Figueroa (2011) asks whether the term length of judges is longer than the term of those who appoint them. Our approach is stricter than either of these:
we expect tenure to enhance judicial independence only if it is for the life of the judge.
3) Selection Procedure. To be able to issue independent decisions, the judiciary must be sufficiently insulated from political pressures to decide cases. The procedures for judicial appointment and removal go to this set of issues. For the appointment process to the highest court, we look at the bodies that nominate and approve appointments. We consider appointment processes that involve a judicial council or two (or more) actors as enhancing judicial independence.
4) Removal Procedure. Even if judges are independently appointed, they will not be independent if they are under constant threat of being removed from office. For the removal procedure, we focus on whether or not the constitution regulates judicial removal and, if so, who proposes removal. The judiciary should be more independent if
judges cannot be removed, if removal requires the proposal of a supermajority vote in the legislature, or if only the public or judicial council can propose removal and another political actor is required to approve such a proposal.
5) Limited Removal Conditions.
Beyond the removal procedure, we believe that the conditions under which judges can be removed affects judicial independence. If the constitution explicitly limits removal to crimes and other issues of misconduct, treason, or violations of the constitution, we expect the judiciary to be more independent.
6) Salary Insulation. It is usually assumed that judges will be more independent if their salaries are protected from reduction. The logic is that political actors might seek to punish judges by reducing their salaries in response to adverse decisions. Many constitutions thus prohibit reductions in salary, and we suspect that this prohibition creates more independent judiciaries.
To measure these six aspects of de jure judicial independence, we use data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), a project that aims to catalogue the contents of all constitutions written around the world since 1789 (Elkins et al. 2011) . 4 For each aspect, we create a binary variable, which is coded one when that aspect of the Constitution is expected to enhance judicial independence in practice and zero otherwise. Thus, we expect to observe a positive relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence in the analysis below.
Before we turn to this analysis, though, let us briefly describe the distribution of de jure protection of judicial independence. We already noted the large increase in constitutional provisions that protect judicial independence since 1985. Most constitutions written after that date contain at least two of the six features that we expect to enhance judicial independence in practice. However, few constitutions written since 1985 protect all six features (only 2%), with the vast majority (85%) protecting between one and four of the features we have identified as theoretically important. More important than the number of features, though, is which ones are protected. Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of newly promulgated constitutions that protect each of the six aspects of de jure judicial independence from 1850 to 2009. It seems that the most of the growth in de jure judicial independence over the last 25 years has come from increases in the number of constitutions with explicit statements of judicial independence. This is the aspect of de jure judicial independence that we expect will be the least effective, because it lacks any affiliated institutional structure. Selection procedures that enhance judicial independence have also been on the rise. All other aspects of constitutions that we associate with judicial independence have been relatively stable over the time period analyzed in figure 2.
Constitutional provisions that guarantee judges tenures and salaries or that protect judges from arbitrary removal have remained relatively stable over time, meaning that most 4 The specific variables and coding rules used to operationalize these aspects of constitutions are provided in table A1 of the online appendix.
constitutions in force lack these features. Of the constitutions in force in 2009, the only aspect of de jure judicial independence found in a majority of texts is a formal declaration of judicial independence. For the other aspects of de jure protection, most constitutions are silent. The term length for judges is not specified in 58% of constitutions, no removal procedure is provided for judges in 48% of constitutions, and there is no mention of salary protection in 83% of constitutions. The exception is the selection procedure. A selection procedure is specified in 70% of constitutions, but in most constitutions, the procedure is not one expected to enhance judicial independence.
Poor aspects. These gaps provide mechanisms for government actors to influence the judiciary, creating the possibility that whatever de jure protection is actually in place will look ineffective.
Although there has been some improvement in de jure protection of judicial independence in recent years, the vast majority of constitutions still lack the comprehensive protection that we suspect is necessary to create an independent judiciary in practice.
The Relationship between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence
We now turn to our analysis of the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial The covariates in the analysis are similar to those used by Hayo and Voigt (2007) , but we also include a number of additional variables that we suspect affect independence in practice.
Specifically, we include variables representing the number of checks and balances, the levels of democracy, press freedom, economic development, size of the population, the number of nongovernmental organizations, religious composition, legal origin, the promulgation year of the constitution, and region fixed-effects. 5 Of these variables, the only one not standard in statistical models of judicial independence is the promulgation year of the constitution, which we include as a proxy for institutional stability. Each model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) using a cross-section of the data from 2008. 6 The results from these models are presented in table 1. We start by creating an additive index like the one used by Hayo and Voigt (2007) . The index is simply the sum of the six binary variables described in the previous section. Model 1 presents the results of regressing this 5 A description of the variables and summary statistics are available in the online appendix. 6 We use a cross-section to be consistent with the approach used by Hayo and Voigt (2007) . theory suggests that multiple aspects of de jure judicial independence must be combined to be effective and that certain aspects of de jure protection are likely to be more effective than others.
As a result, an additive index is clearly inappropriate for our purposes. Such an index does not provide an adequate test of our hypotheses, and given our theory, it seems likely that the effect of de jure judicial independence in model 1 is driven by a few of its components.
Models 2-7 of table 1 break the additive index from model 1 into its constituent parts to assess the effect of each aspect of de jure judicial independence individually. The primary 7 In the online appendix, we report the results from a partial replication of Hayo and Voigt (2007) . The main result is that the results reported by Hayo and Voigt are extremely sensitive to the measures of de jure and de facto judicial independence used in the models. Thus, there is some evidence that at least one of these variables has a statistically significant effect on de facto judicial independence. Lastly, we would like to test the hypothesis set forth by Pozas Loyo and Rios-Figueroa (2008) that de jure judicial independence will be more effective in systems with checks on executive authority. This hypothesis seems particularly applicable for the current study, due to our finding about the importance of the selection and removal procedures for judges. Even if the procedures involve multiple actors at a formal level, it is possible that one party (or interest variables that indicate when the additive index equals 1 or 2 are heterogeneous, so we cannot rule out the possibility that either one of these attributes or a combination of two of the attributes is actually driving the relationship observed in that model. group) might hold all of the positions of power in a system, in which case, the de jure protections established by the constitution could be easily circumvented. The party could undermine the independence of the judiciary while following the constitutionally prescribed procedures, or, depending on the constitutional amendment procedure, it could amend the constitution to establish procedures that give it more influence over the judiciary.
The Combined Effect of Independence Enhancing Selection and Removal Processes
To test this hypothesis, we re-estimated models 4 and 5 from table 2 and included an interaction between the multiplicative de jure index and the number of checks and balances. The results from these models are illustrated in figure 3 . 9 In the figure the solid line illustrates the marginal effect of the index as the number of checks on executive authority increases, and the two dashed lines illustrate the 90% confidence interval around that effect. As predicted by the hypothesis, de jure protection of judicial independence has a stronger effect on de facto judicial independence in countries with checks on executive authority. In both authoritarian and democratic regimes, the effect of having both a selection and removal process that enhances independence increases as the number of checks on executive authority increases. In authoritarian regimes, the effect becomes statistically significant (at the 0.1 level) when the number of veto players is greater than 2, and in democratic regimes the effect becomes statistically significant when the number of veto players is greater than 3. The magnitude of the effect is about twice as large in authoritarian regimes as in democratic regimes, which is consistent with the estimates from models 4 and 5 in table 2.
To summarize the statistical analysis, our results confirm neither the estimates presented in Hayo and Voigt (2007) nor the views of those skeptical of the role that parchment plays in creating an independent judiciary. We find that de jure judicial independence does improve de facto judicial independence, but the effect is limited to those provisions that are self-enforcing as a result of competition between the executive and legislative branches. Specifically, we find that constitutions with processes that involve multiple bodies in the selection and removal of judges are associated with higher levels of judicial independence. This finding is strongest in contexts with checks on the authority of the executive and in authoritarian regimes. In results not shown,
we have assessed the robustness of these findings by pooling the data and estimating the models from table 4 using both population-averaged and fixed-effects estimators. 10 For the most part, the results from the models using the pooled data are consistent with the results from crosssectional analysis reported in tables 3 and 4 and figure 1. The exception is the plot in figure 3 that uses only observations coded as democratic. The slope of the line is positive regardless of whether a population-averaged or fixed-effects model is used as the estimator, but the effect is never statistically significant. As a result, we are most confident in our results that pertain to non-democratic regimes.
Conclusion
The literature on the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is still very small, and in many ways has proceeded without a theory of why text might make a difference in practice. Drawing on the literature on self-enforcing constitutions, we expect that de jure protections that rely on multiple constitutional actors to check each other will be more effective than those that lack obvious mechanisms for self-enforcement. Our theory allows us to differentiate among various de jure protections of independence. We also note that protections for judicial independence ought to work in tandem with each other, so that their impact is likely to be conjunctive rather than additive. That is, clever politicians can exploit the absence of any single de jure protection and so the impact of such protection ought to be highest when all are available.
Our analysis draws on new data from the CCP to examine the relationship between de jure and de facto independence. We first compared the CCP data on de jure independence with the increasingly influential new measure of de facto independence by Linzer and Staton. We find support for our hypotheses, and in particular we show that rules governing the selection and removal of judges are the most important protections for judicial independence. The effect of selection and removal procedures that enhance judicial independence is most pronounced in authoritarian regimes with checks and balances, but we also find some effect in democratic regimes. We tested the robustness of this finding using a number of different estimators and model specifications and find the effect to be quite robust, especially in authoritarian regimes. The results reported here also help us understand the tension in the existing literature on this topic. The positive relationship between de jure and de facto judicial reported by Hayo and Voigt (2007) is largely driven by their use of an additive index, which masks heterogeneity in the effectiveness of different aspects of de jure judicial independence. The lack of a relationship found by other scholars is perhaps the result of case selection, given how rarely effective de jure protection of judicial independence is entrenched in constitutions. For instance, two recent empirical studies find no relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence in postcommunist countries (Smithey and Ishiyama 2002; Herron and Randazzo 2003) . However, few post-communist constitutions establish processes for selecting and removing judges that enhance judicial independence and, importantly, none of the cases analyzed by the aforementioned studies had such protection.
Our findings in this study have important practical implications. A broad consensus has emerged over the last 20 years that an independent judiciary is desirable. However, moving from a desire for judicial independence to practical steps that countries can take to creating one has proven to be a challenge that has been exacerbated by contradictory findings in prior studies about the role of formal institutions in creating an independent judiciary. Our results clarify which aspects of de jure judicial independence enhance judicial independence in practice and under what conditions de jure protection is most effective. In doing so, our results suggest that de facto judicial independence might be improved if countries without selection and removal procedures that insulate judges from the other branches of government adopt such provisions.
The results reported here also have implications for understanding the effectiveness of constitutions as so-called parchment barriers. Our results suggest that certain constitutional provisions do improve judicial independence, and this is an interesting result all on its own. It is even more interesting result when one considers that an independent judiciary is often given the responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the constitution. Thus, a logical hypothesis one could derive from the results reported above is there may be better compliance with constitutional provisions unrelated to the judiciary (such as constitutional rights) in constitutions with specified judicial selection and removal procedures than in countries without such protection for the judiciary. The idea that effective de jure protection of the judiciary can enhance overall compliance with the constitution is an intriguing possibility that is worth testing in future research. Finding such a relationship would suggest that constitutional drafters have some power over whether their products are merely parchment barriers or something more, and that the judiciary indeed has special relevance in ensuring that this is the case. 
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Replication of Hayo and Voigt
One of the only papers to analyze directly the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence cross-nationally is by Hayo and Voigt (2007) . To do so, they rely on subjective indicators of these concepts built by Feld and Voigt (2003) . The indicators are based on a survey distributed to legal experts in each country (e.g. Supreme Court judges, lawyers, and law professors). From this survey, de jure judicial independence is measured using an additive index of 12 items, and de facto judicial independence is measured using an additive index of 8 items. Each index is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The resulting data is available for a crosssection of countries -76 for de jure judicial independence and 67 for de facto judicial independence -circa 2003 (for a full description of these data, see Feld and Voigt 2003) .
Analyzing this data, Hayo and Voigt (2007) find that de jure protection of judicial independence is not only a significant predictor of de facto judicial independence, but it is the strongest predictor. Using these result, they argue that "…the most effective way of increasing freedom -using scores from 1995; 4) religion -using data from the Association of Religion Data Archives. 13 There are a few notably differences between our data and methods in column 2 and the data and methods employed by Hayo and Voigt (2007 Feld and Voigt's (2003) measure is one of the extant measures included in Linzer and Staton's index.
variable is tiny in comparison to the estimates reported by Hayo and Voigt (2007) .
Our findings suggest that Hayo and Voigt's results are very sensitive to alternative measures of de jure and de facto judicial independence. We speculate that this may be because of correlated error in data collection, though we cannot be sure about this. Feld and Voigt (2003) gathered their data using a survey instrument in which they asked the same respondents for assessments of both de jure and de facto judicial independence. One possibility is that respondents who had just evaluated de jure independence may have biased responses to questions about de facto independence in the same survey. Another possibility is that the relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence is obscured by Hayo and Voigt's use of an additive index. Use of an additive index assumes that each component of the index has the same effect on de facto judicial independence. This assumption would be violated if, say, some component of the index has no effect on de facto judicial independence or, as suggested in the theory above, de jure judicial independence is only effective when multiple de jure protections are combined. Hayo and Voigt (2007) . 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** Notes: Models 1 and 2 contain estimates from least squares regression models; models 3 through 6 contain estimates from GEE models with an exchangeable correlation matrix; models 7 through 10 contain estimates from fixed-effects models. De facto judicial independence is the dependent variable for each model, and each model has robust standard errors in parentheses. Multiplie imputation was used prior to estimation of models 3-10 to ensure missing data does not bias the estimates. The estimates from the imputed data sets are combined using Rubin's rules. The constant is omitted from the table and region fixed-effects are omitted from models 1-6. Statistical significant indicated as follows: *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1.
Additional Statistical Results
Figure A2 -Effect of De Jure Judicial Selection and Removal Process by Number of Checks (GEE)
Notes: The figure is based upon the estimates from models 4 and 6 from table A5.
